

Work in the 'new' economy¹

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This paper will address the concept of 'work' and its meaning in current society, drawing on the perspectives of Hannah Arendt and Richard Sennett. Arendt argues that work, over the course of history, has lost its contemplative role since it has become concerned solely with processes and reproduction. Instead of asking "what?", the *homo faber* (man as maker) has begun to ask "how?", thereby dismissing morality and values from its domain. Meanwhile, Sennett re-thinks work by countering that material culture matters. We can achieve a humane material life through understanding the making of things as craftsmen. The craftsman's way of working can offer people an anchor in material reality and modern capitalism, suggesting "ways of using tools, organising bodily movements, thinking about materials that remain alternative, viable [and attractive] proposals about how to conduct life with skill" (p. 11, Sennett, *The Craftsman*).

Introduction

Work is a term which is strangely enough only rarely used in current economic discourse, (apart from its usage in Marxist economics). This is strange because it depicts activities that are pivotal in the realm of 'choices made under scarcity'. The concept of work is fragmented into unemployment, income, productivity and other facets but is not reflected upon in a more conceptual way. In other fields such as philosophy this *is* being done. Using philosophy to rethink and redescribe the concept that underlies a whole of fragmented notions can therefore be useful if one wants to come at more complete understanding of

¹ This paper was presented at the student-run seminar series 'Economics on the border'. Its aim, aligned with the broader aim of the seminar series, was to inform other participants about philosophical accounts given on the concept of 'labour' and 'work'. The aim of the current paper is therefore not to offer an original polemic but rather to explicate existing thought as a stepping stone for following discussion.

work. This paper will aim at providing a discussion of the fragmented concept of work through Arendt and Sennett. Addressing the questions 'what is work?' and 'what is (and could be) its meaning in current society according to Arendt and Sennett?' is a somewhat ambitious project. I will try to provide an answer to these questions in this relatively short paper by first giving a short historical narrative of the use of the term 'work' by Hegel and Marx because they form a line of thought on which Arendt continues². I will then go on by describing Arendt's distinction between the notion of work and of labour and the analysis for which this distinction is used. Next a connection will be made between Sennett's theory of craftsmanship and Arendt's analysis. The notion of craftsmanship will then be placed in the context of modern capitalism which Sennett describes. Finally I will argue that Sennett's craftsmanship offers a welcome redescription that might open up an alternative or new way of thinking about work and creating working-practices as well as the social conditions which this requires.

'What is work?'

According to Hegel work is "the instrument for preparing and acquiring specialised means adequate to specialised wants" (§196, Hegel, *Philosophy of right*³). Hegel writes of '*Arbeit*' which is translated with the word 'labour' in paragraph 196, but translated with the word 'work' in paragraph 198⁴. The two terms apparently depict the same concept. In the latter paragraph Hegel writes that the abstraction of *Arbeit* gives rise to a specialisation of production, also known as the division of labour⁵. The division of labour or abstraction of skills and means has as a consequence that the mutual interdependent relation of citizens is 'completed' and that labour becomes more and more mechanical until "it is at last possible for man to step out and let the machine take his place" (§198, Hegel, *POR*). The underlying

² At least when it comes to the notion of 'labour'.

³ Henceforth abbreviated as *POR*.

⁴ This implies that the translator judged the terms 'work' and 'labour' as interchangeable. No references were given to this choice in the translators preface (S.W. Dyde).

⁵ the concept 'division of labour' was introduced by Adam Smith in his 'The wealth of nations', although Mandeville already described its effects in his 'Fable of the bees'. Smith explains the division of labour as the separation of an amount of small functions or stages of a production chain over an amount of occupations, thereby increasing efficiency through specialisation (pp. 9-22, Smith, *The wealth of nations*). A pin for example that is made out of eighteen distinct operations can be made much faster and efficient by dividing the operations over several occupations. The factory worker ends up doing the same small task continuously.

theory maintains that the subject's striving for his wants becomes a collective satisfaction of wants; thus the particular (*Besondere*) is necessarily converted through the dialectical movement in the universal (*Allgemeine*).

The capitalist division of labour was already known to Hegel. His 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts' was published in 1821 in Berlin, at that time the Ruhr Valley (Ruhrgebiet) in Germany was already a highly industrialised area in which the division of labour was implemented on a large scale. Hegel's interpretation of labour implements the division of labour within a historical line as a logical development which will eventually lead to the end of labour (as humans will be replaced by machines). The short paragraphs devoted to labour leave much open though. What will people do when all their labour is being done by machines?⁶ Is there maybe a form of 'work', apart from normal labour, which will never be replaced by machinery?

After having defined work in general, Hegel offers a further analysis of the role of work in the civil society. He does so by distinguishing different sorts of work, or more specifically, 'working classes' (§ 200-206). In the society as a whole three classes are to be distinguished: the substantial class, the industrial class and the universal class. These classes are formed out of conglomerates of professions which are affiliated with certain ways of living, skill and capital. The substantial class consists of those who gain wealth from "natural products obtained by cultivation" (§ 203, Hegel, *POR*). This class, which consists of what could be called the agricultural sector, is dependent on god⁷ for that which is 'given' to them (the harvest). This particular set-up ensures that its members feel dependent and more inclined to subjection. Because of this the substantive class embodies the morals founded on trust and family life. It is the vocation of the industrial class to "alter the form of the products of nature" (§ 204, Hegel, *POR*). Instead of being dependent on nature's 'gifts' this class is dependent upon its labour, reflection and the 'interposition of the wants and labours of

⁶ Hegel's 'prediction' about the mechanisation of labour is propagated today by critics such as Jeremy Rifkin (Rifkin, *The end of work*). Rifkin holds that modern information technology leads to a global loss of jobs in the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors. Rifkin poses an interesting scenario which will be further reflected upon below.

⁷ Hegel writes of 'god' in § 203 and in § 204 of a 'stranger'. Thereby it might be inferred that the focus lies on a relation of dependence on a higher entity, be it god, a stranger or 'mother nature'.

others'. Because of this attitude members of the industrial class are more self-referential. This in turn arouses a -class specific- desire for freedom. Thirdly there exists a universal class. The universal class consists of professions which are needed in order to sustain the existing order and provide for other general interests of society. These three mentioned classes are not contingent but historical necessities. Subjects belong to one of these classes according to capacity, birth and other circumstances. The role of work is thus split into three different fields each of which entails a different sub-definition of work. The role in turn changes even the ethical outlook of its subsequent class. This formative aspect of work can be found in Karl Marx's conception of work too.

The definition of labour that is given by Hegel coincides neatly with Karl Marx's theory. Marx differed though on Hegel's interpretation of 'their' time. The classes in a society have no intrinsic status but are relative to each other. The so called universal class is not 'needed' in order to control the system of a state but keeps suppressing the working class which leads to enduring 'class struggle'. The possession of capital separates the ones who are in control of the production process from those who aren't. Marx used Hegel's dialectical method to criticise the developments inherent in the capitalist society. With the mechanisation and the division of labour a crucial inherent function of labour needed by man is lost. The labourer performing specialised labour without control over the production process is used for his surplus value by the one's in possession of the means to production (read: capital). He no longer realises his 'slumbering' powers through labour. The latter was seen as a crucial function of labour for human beings.

"Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway." (p. 115, Marx, Capital).

Labour can here be read as a metabolic process, a natural function of humans to procure survival. But at the same time man changes his own nature by doing so. Labour is thus needed for man in order to realise a certain form of living, not just instrumentally

(metabolic) but as an inherent part of realising the good life. This latter view can be contrasted with the interpretation of labour as toilsome, bad and something people ought to be freed from. In the end the liberation from the necessity of labour was attributed to (the younger) Marx as well. Upon closer review this forms no contradiction. Marx was concerned with a certain form of labour. This form of labour is the non-alienated '*Werk*' (work, associated with the pre-industrial artisan or craftsman) in which the labourer has complete control over the production process. He would be able to get involved in all the production stages of a product for the means for production would be communal and accessible to each individual labourer. In accordance to this the person would enjoy a high degree of freedom in the trade-off between leisure and work. The ideal situation would allow a worker to freely choose for work and even switch profession on the scale of a day. The worker would ideally be able "to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner (...) without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic" (A, h5, Marx & Engels, The German ideology). By doing so a person obviously develops a broad palette of faculties or 'slumbering powers'. At the same time it seems obvious to Marx (and Friedrich Engels) that man would choose to work this much and be so productive.

Already a certain distinction can be found between different forms of work in Marx's writings⁸; where labour is seen as a metabolic process, '*Werk*' is used to refer to a pre-industrial and pre-alienated form of activity. The words 'work' and 'labour' are used interchangeably in day to day life. It is Hannah Arendt who distinguished labor⁹ from work (and action) as significantly different concepts. Drawing on John Locke's description of 'the labour of our body and the work of our hands' (sec. 26, Locke, Second treatise of civil government) Arendt (re)describes labor as continuation of the life process and work as the making of durable objects. Arendt retraces an etymological difference between the two terms. In Ancient Greece labour was perceived as being enslaved by necessity. Where possible this was something that would be outsourced to slaves or servants. Labour, by the

⁸ I could not find an explicit distinction made by Marx, but there certainly is a difference in his concept of labor which can be found in 'Capital' and the concept of 'work' which is used in 'The German ideology'.

⁹ Hannah Arendt writes of 'labor', this depicts the same as 'labour', in this paper the two ways of writing (resp. American and English) are used completely interchangeable.

way, does not just stand for reaping harvest and producing food, it covers the (necessary) consumption of these products as well. Insofar that one is occupied with this cyclical process of life continuation one is an *animal laborans*. But humans are also *homo faber* when they create durable objects guided by an 'idea'¹⁰ or model.

Arendt uses these distinctions (the classical form of critique, etymologically speaking) to elaborate on what she thinks is a shift in hierarchy from the *vita contemplativa* to the *vita activa*. This shift has followed closely on a modern development which started with the invention of the telescope by Galileo. The telescope allowed man to change his perspective on the world, to place the Archimedean point outside of our own planet in a heliocentric model. This implied that the truth was no longer received through senses or contemplation, but had to be searched after actively through experiments or tools. An instrument had proved our trust in the received reality of our senses wrong. After realising the discredit this brought to our senses, explicated in Descartes doubt, this Archimedean point was moved into man himself. Thus leading to what Arendt calls 'Cartesian world-alienation'¹¹. The consciousness of the subject formed the new foundation for existence - *cogito ergo sum*. The only certainty left was the action of our consciousness and the unalterable truth of mathematics, (ergo: reason). "Neither god nor an evil spirit can change the fact that two and two equal four" (p. 284, Arendt, *The human condition*¹²). Mathematics was linked to physics and linked to physical reality by conducting experiments. This whole enterprise though, still deals with a hypothetical nature: "the world of the experiment seems always capable of becoming a man-made reality" (p. 288, Arendt, *THC*). The scientist discovers the patterns which he created himself in his experiments.

¹⁰ This contemplative aspect of creating durable objects is very important and I will get back to this further on. Arendt writes on this guiding idea on pp. 301-302 (Arendt, *The human condition*).

¹¹ Marx in a way was guilty of this Cartesian world-alienation as well. Hannah Arendt comments that although Marx defends a critique of self-alienation his work ethos replaces this with *world-alienation*. Humans in Marx's ideal world objectify their individuality through work to confirm and actualise their 'true being': "Unsere Produktionen wären ebensoviele Spiegel, woraus unser Wesen sich entgegen leuchtete" (pp. 546-47, Part 1, Vol. III, Marx, *Gesamtausgabe*). The world of objects, externalities is hence 'degraded' to mirrors for the projection of a subject.

¹² 'The human condition' will henceforth be abbreviated as *THC*.

The shift from contemplation to action/doing (not to be understood as Arendt's concept of action) was guided by the practical incentives of technological innovation instead of theoretical motives which used to be dominant. The first clock was invented with a theoretical purpose of conducting experiments on nature. Practical use of clocks and watches which followed this invention were coincidents from the standpoint of the inventors. Contemplation became measured by practical results and truth and knowledge could no longer be derived at through contemplation or passive observation but had to be proved by action. Thinking retained value only as an instrument and lost its intrinsic meaning. Summarising Arendt's point: over the course of the development of science two guidelines became predominant. Certain knowledge had to be derived at from one's own conscious actions (Cartesian doubt) and secondly these mathematical premisses had to be *made* sure. Man's trust was given, as Arendt puts it, to the 'ingenuity of his hands'. The atomic theory is true if technology based on its validity works; the evolution theory is true if it can be inferred from the presence of certain phenomena.

In working, in making, the *homo faber* holds the potential of contemplation in so far as he is concerned with the imperishable and eternal through the delights of his working experience (the created objects form a lasting surrounding between man and nature, objects thereby constitute objectivity). The process of making though has changed over time. In the understanding of fabricating

"the emphasis shifted entirely away from the product and from the permanent, guiding model to the fabrication process, away from the question what a thing is and what kind of thing was to be produced to the question of how and through which means and processes it had to come into being and could be reproduced. For this implied both that contemplation was no longer believed to yield truth and that it has lost its position in the *vita activa* itself and hence within the range of ordinary human experience." (Arendt, *THC*, p. 304).

The making of objects becomes the process of reproduction. In our modern time *homo faber's* traits were predominant: the instrumentality of the world, his trust in tools and the conviction that every problem can be solved. This led to a high esteem of work, only soon to be replaced by labour and a pre-dominant position of the *animal laborans*. The predetermined usage of the makings of *homo faber* were replaced by a happiness calculus: "the amount of pain and pleasure experienced in the production or consumption of things" (p. 309, Arendt,

THC). Making objects becomes a cyclical production process which means that working becomes another form of labouring. Human life itself became the only foundation, the human condition solely aimed at continuation of the cyclical processes of life.

How does Richard Sennett's evaluation of modern capitalism and craftsmanship relate to Arendt's critique? Sennett uses Arendt's theory as a stepping stone in his prologue of 'The Craftsman' by differentiating himself from her distinction between *homo faber* -who asks 'why'¹³- and *animal laborans* -who asks 'how'-. Sennett writes that "the animal who is animal laborans is capable of thinking" (p. 7, Sennett, The craftsman). But by creating a false dichotomy¹⁴ between either working as *animal laborans* or judging as *homo faber* he implies that the *homo faber* is not capable of working. A false accusation; the *animal laborans* is concerned with survival and not with making, this is not the status which could be associated with Sennett's materialism (Arendt places it -contrasted to materialism- under naturalism). *Homo faber* shows many similarities with the craftsman (and is even named such by Arendt on pp. 302-3 of THC). The projects of Arendt and Sennett at certain points coincide and it therefore seems strange why Sennett creates an antagonist out of Arendt.

It would be wrong though to reduce these two concepts to one since there are also differences. A difference between Arendt's *homo faber* and Sennett's craftsman is Sennett's focus on the intertwinement of thinking and making in craftsmanship. Thinking does not occur before and after making (as is the case with Arendt's *homo faber*) but happens throughout the process. This is partly how Sennett defends that a better understanding of making things can actually achieve a more humane sort of material life. Other differences are the reasons why Sennett introduces the notion of craftsmanship. Sennett has a different analysis of our current times than Arendt. The reasons Sennett offers through his writings for exploring a new way of 'living with materialism' are various: In order to cope with

¹³ Arendt actually writes of 'what' instead of 'why', this is an important difference and its strange why Sennett uses this false quotation (p. 305, THC). Possibly Sennett has an interpretation of Arendt in which the *homo faber* is combined with the political figure, this would mean a reduction of work and action to one dimension.

¹⁴ On pages 6-7 Sennett writes that according to Arendt we live in two (instead of three, which would include 'action') dimensions, "in one we make things" and in the other we "stop producing and start discussing and judging together" (Sennett, The craftsman). Sennett thereby ignores Arendt's description of labour and work when he reduces these dimensions to one which is opposed to action.

technology (Pandora's Box¹⁵), deal with personal consequences of flexible new work (character and losers) and the indifference or lack of responsibility of modern institutions. I will try to explain these different reasons for introducing this (medieval) concept of craftsmanship by first sketching Sennett's vision of the culture of the new capitalism.

Modern capitalism has fundamentally changed work and thereby its role in our society. Sennett holds that this new culture (aligned with a new form of capitalism) is embedded in the structure of the economy and thereby in the structure of modern companies. In the old structure certain companies and bureaucracies existed that have now made way for a new type of company (thereby creating new and different working conditions). The metaphors that Sennett uses to characterize these different structures are the pyramid and the mp3-player. The old company's structure resembles a pyramid because in its hierarchical shape a large quantity of employees can be hired at the lowest level. Because of the (social) inclusion thus derived at, the model offered masses stability and a place in society. The structure of the new type of companies at the other hand resembles an mp3-player because it is able to choose out of a wide range of personnel (or songs) through a central guiding unit which one to use at which time. The new company hires working units on project based terms. Instead of including a large number on a long term¹⁶, its goal is to be flexible and adjustable to changes. On a micro-scale the employee (or often free lancer) has to be able to cope with change as well and be able to work in different teams and offer his services as an entrepreneur.

In the new (late 20th century - now) capitalism, the old bureaucracies, which included a great number of persons in their pyramidal structure, are torn open because of a combination of several factors. National constraints on international investment weakened in the early 70's

¹⁵ Pandora's box is a metaphor for the man-made backfiring dangers of technology eg the atom bomb. This is a problem that Sennett addresses in 'The craftsman', I will not go into this issue in this current paper but think it suffices to state that a way of working that involves thinking throughout the process and is deeply engaged offers a more responsible way of coping with technology according to Sennett.

¹⁶ The old companies aimed at growing and including the competition (think of General Motors or other Rockefeller-like companies), the growth was partly measured in number of employees. Like a general the CEO would be commander of an army of workers. In the new companies, having a large amount of stable 'lifelong' employees is seen as encumbering. The main thing (the contemporary, highly successful) consulting firms do is increase 'efficiency' which is often done by streamlining a company and firing or downsizing personnel.

(after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreements) combined with the increased power of shareholders investing 'impatient capital'. Because of this companies were pressured to amass short term profits and look innovative and fluid. This structural change leads to three social deficits associated with the concept of 'social capital': 1) low institutional loyalty 2) diminishment of informal trust between workers 3) weakening of institutional knowledge. Apart from the loss in social capital the changes to a more flexible society on a personal level result in a conflicting life-narrative for persons who uphold values such as loyalty in the family domain and values such as flexibility in a professional sphere¹⁷. Feeling a sense of life narrative may even be problematic because cutting-edge institutions work with such short time frames that it becomes hard to connect experiences or accumulate knowledge.

The new form of capitalism has erected a new meritocracy. Companies have developed specific ways for finding those who possess the skills needed to adapt to change. Knowledge, experience or deep engagement no longer matter as much as they used to. The modern worker is judged mainly by potential (talent) and flexibility. A complete arsenal of measuring tests has been designed to detect these merits. Apart from the well-known IQ-, EQ-, and SAT¹⁸ scores a range of psychological and personality tests are being used in order to find high potentials and hire the right person. Focussing upon these innate merits creates objectified failure because the standards are presented as impersonal and context-neutral. When negative results are personally devastating because they measure something that is inalterable and lies deep within a person. In the meritocracy a spotlight is put on the elite that achieve high scores, but masses are left in the shadow. This ideal which is attained by only a few works disempowering to the mass of workers. For the state this raises a question: what should we do with those that are cast out in our economy? The demand that is raised by governments that wanted to get rid of the classic welfare state is to be self-sufficient, not to be useless in economically measurable terms. Instead of having a right to a certain life, governments are increasingly concerned with the duty to work a certain quantity of hours or amass a certain quantity of salary.

¹⁷ This problematic situation is elaborated in 'The corrosion of character' (Sennett).

¹⁸ Scholastic aptitude tests used in the United States of America at the end of high school.

To summarize Sennett: Sennett describes an, according to him, pivotal change in the culture of our economy. The social capitalism which has originated in the nineteenth century has over the past decades made way for a new sort of capitalism. This new sort of capitalism is a meritocracy in which potential, talent and flexibility are appraised because these attributes allow one to cope with the high degree of change. His description includes a critique of these changes because they have not, as they did pretend to do, set people free. Instead they have left many in our society out and have created new problems even for those who *do* manage to function in the new environment¹⁹.

In order to provide persons with values and stability –a culture-, to offer them an ‘anchor’ in this new world characterized by change, Sennett proposes the ethos of craftsmanship²⁰. He proposes his ethos as something humans can internalize (as a working ethos) but he more importantly points out how social conditions shape the motivation which in turn allows persons to become good craftsmen. Therefore Sennett’s proposal is aimed not simply at individual workers -as a sort of working-guide- but also at our social conditions. Craftsmanship entails a desire to do something well for its own sake. The satisfaction of doing something well and to believe in what you do are things that all human beings want and things that all human beings are capable of (p. 194, Sennett, *The culture of the new capitalism*; p. 241, Sennett, *The craftsman*). This enterprise according to Sennett is the only way to anchor oneself in reality²¹. The goal of doing something well possesses intrinsic value for he who aims it.

¹⁹ One could ask to whom these changes are deficits. Sennett points out that these are deficits for elder people who no longer show great flexibility and offer critique through voice instead of exit. They also form a deficit for those in general who experience objectified failure. Testing potential and talent leaves persons out who do not have the high IQ- or SAT-score for example. But even for the successful persons who are flexible and move every time a new job opens etc. this situation poses difficulties (see footnote 15).

²⁰ Other options are offered as well in ‘*The culture of the new capitalism*’ (pp. 183-193). These other (two) options are finding ways of enabling *narrativity* (job sharing, basic income or parallel institutions) and searching new ways for people to be recognised as *useful* (by for example funding ‘invisible’ care work or expanding public services).

²¹ I think this statement made by Sennett at page 197 of ‘*The culture of the new capitalism*’ does not mean that there are no other ways of creating an anchor outside of craftsmanship but rather that this is a general principle and that craftsmanship is a more specific way of developing this. Performing rites is hinted at in the prologue of ‘*The craftsman*’ as another sort of craft, or as we can put it, another way of anchoring oneself through finding something one feels worth doing for its own sake.

The above described justification of craftsmanship can be criticized because of the universal and paternalistic claims it makes: all human beings want x and y; x and y are the only things that can provide a form of the good life to humans which they all need. A form of thinking that has largely been abandoned by post-modern contemporary philosophers²². But I think it's more interesting to read Sennett's proposal in a different, 'Rortyan', way. Richard Rorty envisaged a society, his so-called liberal utopia, which does no longer need philosophical foundations in order to stand for something 'unflinchingly' (Chapter 3, Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity). This society would accept that not the scientist but those who are able to offer new vocabularies or install new practices change its contingent ways. The proposal for craftsmanship is not grounded in a-historical necessary truths as the earlier stated 'founding principles' might suggest. Craftsmanship offers a new vocabulary or 'language game'. One that answers our desire for meaningful ways of engagement through work. One that answers to our current economic situation, the culture of the new capitalism (if one accepts Sennett's description, which I think is very persuasive). The notion of craftsmanship allows persons to perceive themselves in a different way and it thereby opens up a way of appreciation²³. If people are attracted by this vocabulary they could thereby be persuaded to not only accept craftsmanship as a personal ethos but install those social conditions that allow for and stimulate craftsmanship. A question that remains and hasn't been addressed in this paper is *how* and *if* social conditions can be reformed to allow for and stimulate craftsmanship. The consequences for a modern globalized world might be more severe and drastic than they seem at first hand.

Conclusion

In this paper the concept of 'work' was traced from Hegel to Marx to Arendt and Sennett. Arendt's criticizes a modernity in which man is solely *animal laborans*, urging for a more complete human condition which includes contemplation found either fully fledged in a

²² Thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, John Rawls and Richard Rorty have argued persuasively for the abandonment of a universal and or a-historical 'paternalistic' account of the good life based on philosophical foundations.

²³ This is another way in which Arendt and Sennett's enterprises of re-describing work differ. Whereas Arendt fulfills a 'traditional' (In line with a tradition of culture critics such as Heidegger, Adorno, Ortega y Gasset and others) role as a culture critic, Sennett is more concerned with offering theory as a tool for improving practices. Arendt warns us for certain changes that have slowly but steadily encroached upon man's originally more complete way of living. Sennett tries to open up a way of (re-)creating new practices.

political way of living or more embodied in the making of things. Man as maker or *homo faber* is a condition of living –which I have argued- that bears close resemblances to Sennett’s concept of craftsmanship. But Sennett’s theory (or should I call it ‘proposal’) of craftsmanship stems from a different analysis of our current culture. Moreover it offers a proposal that offers us a *practical* (understood as aimed at practices) ‘way out’. I have argued that it can and should be read as a proposal for conducting our working lives as well as reforming our social conditions by offering an attractive vocabulary with which to address ‘work’ in our current society.

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